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— potential and  lim its o f the concept
T h e  case o f  Ruiz Zambrano
The term  „substance o f  the  rights conferred by virtue o f  their status as citizens 
o f  the  U n io n “ was used by the ECJ for the  first tim e in 2011 in the  case o f 
R u iz  Z a m b r a n o .1 The judgm ent was based on the following facts2: The couple 
R u iz  Z a m b r a n o  applied for asylum in Belgium. B oth  spouses had  C olom bian 
citizenship. The request was rejected, bu t the  couple was no t deported  for the 
tim e being. D espite o f  his im m igration  status no t being clarified and  w ith o ­
u t residence perm it, the  husband  kept on w orking in Belgium. D urin g  this 
tim e, his wife gave b irth  to  tw o children w ho acquired Belgian nationality  
by jus soli principle. Their nationality  was a so-called substitu te  nationality, 
w hich the  children ob tained  due to  the  fact th a t their parents h ad  failed 
to  apply for C olom bian  citizenship at the  C olom bian  Embassy. W hen  the 
husband  becam e unem ployed, the  com peten t Belgian authorities refused to 
grant h im  unem ploym ent benefits: Even if  he had  actually paid  the  unem ­
ploym ent con tribu tions regularly, he h ad  reached the  relevant num ber o f 
w orking days only in violation o f  the  provisions o f  the  Belgian N ationality  
C ode -  so the  reasoning. The husband  appealed against this decision, argu­
ing th a t he was en titled  to  the  right o f  residence directly by v irtue o f  the  E C  
Treaty because he was the  father o f  underage citizens o f  the  U nion. Since the 
existence o f  such a right o f  residence en titled  h im  autom atically  to  unem ­
1 Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011], No. 42.
2 Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011], No. 14 ff.
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ploym ent benefits, the  com peten t Belgian labour court m ade the  m atter the 
subject o f  a question referred to  the  ECJ.
The C o u rt held  th a t the  m ino r children o f  R u iz  Z a m b r a n o  w ould  be de­
prived o f  the benefits o f  the  substance o f  the rights conferred by virtue o f 
the ir status as citizens o f  the U nion  as long as the ir father d id  no t receive 
a residence and  w ork p erm it.3 Since he gran ted  m aintenance to  his children, 
the  children w ould  be com pelled to  leave the  territo ry  o f  the  U nion  in order 
to  accom pany their father to  his hom e country.
I f  the  substance o f the  rights is denied, the U nion  law applies -  this is the 
m ain legal statem ent o f  the  judgm ent. This creates a new  elem ent o f  U nion 
citizenship and opens its scope o f  application to  cases, w hich are independent 
from  any cross-border elem ent. It also includes a new  feature o f  European 
citizenship: The status o f  citizen o f  the  U nion  makes it possible to  invoke E u ­
ropean U nion  law, w ithou t the  relevant facts having a cross-border elem ent.4
T h e  n e w  fu n c tio n  o f  Union c itizensh ip
The verbalisation o f  this new  feature o f  E uropean citizenship by the  ECJ is 
seen as an epic event o f  in tegration  politics -  as here is a quote  -  a „daw n o f 
a new  U nion”.5
The reason for this can be seen in the  fact tha t for a certain group o f  cases 
the  m obility  dogm a is abandoned , a dogm a w hich states th a t E U  law is rele­
vant only if  the  U nion  citizen’s freedom  o f  m ovem ent is exercised.6 From  now  
on, the  E U  law  is relevant even in purely dom estic situations. The U nion  law 
protects the  individual against his own state and  th a t only due to  the fact tha t 
he or she is a U nion  citizen.7
3 Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011], No. 44.
4 See also K. Hailbronner, D. Thym, Ruiz Zambrano — Die Entwicklung des Kernbereichs der 
Unionsbürgerschaft, “Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht” (NVwZ) 2001, p. 2009; A. Mo- 
hay, D. Muhvic, The legal nature o f the E U  citizenship: perspectives from international and E U  
law, [in:] Contemporary Legal Challenges: E U  — Hungary — Croatia, ed. T. Drinoczi, M. Zupan, 
Z. Ercsey, M. Vinkovic, Pecs-Osijek 2012, p. 72 f.; D Kochenov, The essence o f E U  citizenship 
emerging from the last ten years o f academic debate: Beyond the cherry blossoms and the moon?,
ICLQ 2013, p. 111 ff.
5 Ibidem, p. 134.
6 Regarding the development of the case law see D. Kochenov, R. Plender, E U  Citizenship: From 
an Incipient Form to an Incipient Substance? The Discovery o f the Treaty Text, E.L. Rev. 2012,
p. 375 ff.
7 In the Case Grzelczyk the ECJ formulated the much cited formula that the Union citizenship 
is destined to „be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States, enabling those 
who find themselves in the same situation to enjoy the same treatment in law irrespective of 
their nationality, subject to such exceptions as are expressly provided“. See Case C-184/99
Grzelczyk [2001], No. 31.
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The m obility  dogm a was linked to  the  original concept o f  the  m arket 
citizen, as it was p u t forw ard in the  60s and  70s. A ccording to  this concept, 
the  E uropean C o m m u n ity  law changed the  legal status o f  foreign citizens o f 
o ther E C  M em ber States in any E C  M em ber State to  the  extent required for 
the  purposes o f  E C  in tegration .8 A nd  since these purposes were lim ited  on 
the  econom ic integration  -  it was about the  creation o f  a com m on m arket -  
one used the term  „m arket citizens“. In  this sense, the  m arket citizens in the 
E C  M em ber States were „not as foreign as o ther foreigners“.9 However, this 
change in  status only had  a functional character, linked to  the  E C  aim s.10
O ver tim e, the  dogm a o f  m obility  as a criterion o f  applicability o f  U nion 
law has lost its tangibility. The functional linkage o f  E uropean integration  to 
the  realisation o f  the  com m on m arket was abandoned. The current catalogue 
o f  integration  objectives, w hich is defined in Article 3 T E U  -  this will be 
discussed later on -  is far m ore com prehensive, as it also includes the  im ­
p lem entation  o f  a catalogue o f  values codified in Article 2 T E U . By this, the 
European in tegration  goes beyond its original purpose. It is no t anym ore just 
a m atter o f  developing in ternational cooperation in Europe after the  horrors 
o f  W orld  W ar II. Insofar, the  p rom otion  o f  m obility  o f  citizens in a variety o f 
form s11, w hich has found  expression in the E uropean fundam ental freedoms, 
has effectively proved to  be a fitting  instrum ent. Now, there is m ore at stake. 
It is about build ing  a com m unity  th a t is based on certain values12, w ithou t 
necessarily being understood  as one state („non-state po lity“) .13 It is there­
fore no t surprising tha t the ECJ asks itself, w hether this integration  can be 
achieved, if  the  applicability o f  E U  law rem ains dependent on cross-border 
m ovem ent.
8 H.P. Ipsen, Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht, Tübingen 1972, p. 252. This development is part­
ly conceived as a gradual overcoming of the traditional aliens laws approach, which has its 
roots in police laws of the 19th century, by the European immigration law, created to promote 
the free movement of Europeans. See J. Bergmann, Abschied vom deutschen Ausländerrecht? — 
Europarechtliche Provokationen, ZAR 2013, p. 321; similar from a British perspective J. Shaw, 
N. Miller, M. Fletcher, Getting to grips with E U  citizenship: Understanding the friction between 
UK immigration law and E U  free movement law, Edinburgh 2013, p. 36.
9 H.P. Ipsen, op. cit., p. 252.
10 Ibidem, p. 251.
11 See N. Nic Shuibhne, The resilience o f E U  market citizenship, CMLR 2010, p. 1608.
12 According to Chr. Callies, the „structural features of a liberal constitutional state“ are embod­
ied in the values and integration objectives of the TEU. See Ch. Callies, Die neue Europäis­
che Union nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon. Ein Überblick über die Reformen unter Berücksichti­
gung ihrer Implikationen fü r  das deutsche Recht, Tübingen 2010, p. 87. See also D. Kochenov, 
R. Plender, op. cit., p. 383.
13 Regarding the concept of „non-state polity“ see N. Nic Shuibhne, op. cit., p. 1600 ff., where­
upon the author does not think that the concept of the market citizen is antiquated. See also 
D. Kochenov, op. cit., p. 127.
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Consequently, the  U nion  citizenship in troduced  by the M aastricht Treaty 
is m ore th an  just a m arket citizenship. The E uropean U nion  citizenship led 
accordingly to  a m uch deeper change in the  legal status o f  foreigners than  
a pure m arket citizenship. The original paradigm , th a t the  effect o f  U nion 
citizenship was lim ited  to  m ajor or m inor corrections o f  national provisions 
o f  im m igration  law  o f one M em ber State regarding citizens o f  o ther M em ber 
States, was upheld  only as long as the  applicability o f  U nion  law was linked 
to  the  criterion o f  mobility.
Since the  judgm en t in the  case o f  R u iz  Z a m b ra n o ,  this paradigm  has been 
underm ined . However, it had  been under challenge for som e tim e anyway.14 
That was the  case no t only because o f  the p ro fo u n d  changes, w hich the  status 
o f  E U  citizens had  undergone by U nion  law, bu t also because o f  the fact tha t 
the  requirem ent o f  a cross-border elem ent is in terpreted  very widely.
The cross-border requirem ent is fulfilled even if  a Brit -  as in the  case C ar­
pen te r15 — is selling advertising spaces from  the U K  in British newspapers for 
advertisers from  other M em ber States, such as from  Germany. It is obvious 
tha t G erm an im m igration law is no t affected by this. In the case o f  Garcia 
Avello, even a de facto surrender o f  the criterion o f  a cross-border elem ent 
can be observed.16 W hether the  Belgian p rohib ition  o f a child to  be nam ed 
according to  the  Spanish custom  o f  a double nam e has a negative effect on the 
m obility  o f  this child if  it has the  desire to  move to  Spain is only speculation. 
D ue to  the continuous w eakening o f  the criterion o f  „cross-border facts“ le­
gal certainty is negatively affected: It is now  difficult to  apprehend, w hether 
a situation has a cross-border nature. The cross-border elem ent o f  a case — and 
therefore also the applicability o f  E U  law  — depends thus on contingencies.17
Since the case o f  R u iz  Z a m b r a n o , in cases, in w hich the substance o f  the 
status o f  a U nion  citizenship is denied to  an E U  citizen, the im m igration 
law aspect o f  U nion  citizenship has vanished no t only d e  fa c to , bu t also as 
a m atter o f  principle.
T h e  c o n ten t o f  the  substance  o f  the  righ ts according  
to p rev io u s  case law  o f  th e  E C J
The entire post-R uiz Z a m b r a n o  case law, in w hich the concept o f  the substan­
ce o f  the  rights o f  the  E U  citizen was relevant, is related to  the  right o f  resi­
14 See K. Hailbronner, D. Thym, op. cit., p. 2008; D. Kochenov, R. Plender, op. cit., p. 375 f.
15 See Case C-60/00 Carpenter [2001], No. 14 and 37. This case is cited by the case Ruiz Zam­
brano by Advocate General Sharpston, see A.G. Sharpston, 30.09.2010, No. 73.
16 See Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello [2003].
17 In this sense AG Sharpston, 30.09.2010, No. 84.
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dence for those th ird -co u n try  nationals w ho are family m em bers o f  a U nion 
citizen. The consequence o f  all this case law is tha t the  actual enjoym ent o f 
the  substance o f  the  rights resulting from  U nion  citizenship can then  be con­
sidered denied, if  the  U nion  citizen is d e  fa c to  com pelled to  leave the territo ry  
o f  the  U nion. O f  the  seven previously decided cases, the  C o u rt has affirmed 
th a t cond ition  only in  one case -  in the case o f  R u iz  Z a m b r a n o .18 Since the 
judgm en t in the case D ereci the  C o u rt emphasizes tha t it is for the  national 
courts to  determ ine the  existence o f  these cond itions.19 In  the case o f  O . and 
S., the  C o u rt requires the existence o f  a relationship o f  dependency between 
the  citizens o f  the U nion  and  the th ird  coun try  national, w ho derives his 
right o f  residence from  the  U nion  citizen status o f  the  U nion  citizen.20 In the 
sam e decision, the  C o u rt notes tha t the  principles, w hich have been establi­
shed in the  case o f  R u iz  Z a m b ra n o , apply only under „exceptional circum ­
stances“.21 It should  be added th a t a case like R u iz  Z a m b r a n o  will no t occur 
frequently, as naturalisation  under the jus soli principle has been restricted 
th rough  a reform  o f  im m igration  law, for exam ple in Belgium  and  Ireland, in 
response to  the  ECJ case law.22
As epochal as the  function  o f  the  concept o f  „substance o f  the rights o f 
a U nion  citizen“, as meagre, if  no t m arginal, is its norm ative conten t. It is 
a paradox th a t an approach tha t poor in substance is regarded as one o f  the 
m ost im portan t developm ents in  the  E C J’s case law.
The concept was subject to  a lo t o f  criticism. It is p u t in to  question by refer­
ring  to  the  derivative character o f  U nion  citizenship. The U nion  citizenship 
said to  be a iu s tractum ;  deriving from  the  national citizenship. Therefore 
-  according to  the  critics -  it is no t correct to  derive rights from  the  U nion 
citizenship, if  these rights are no t expressly assigned to  the  U nion  citizens in 
o ther provisions o f  the  founding  treaties. U nion  citizenship is said to  be k ind
18 The following decisions ware based on the approach developed in Ruiz Zambrano: Case
C-434/09 McCarthy [2011]; Case C-256/11 Dereci [2011]; Cases C-356/11, C-357/11
O. and S. [2011]; Case C-40/11 Lida [2012]; Case C-87/12 Ymerga [2013] and Case C-86/12 
Alokpa [2013].
19 Case C-256/11 Dereci [2011], No. 74.
20 Cases C-356/11, C-357/11 O. and S. [2011], No. 56.
21 Cases C-356/11, C-357/11 O. and S. [2011], No. 55.
22 See S. Corneloup, Citoynnete europeenne: la Cour de justice apporte une nouvelle pierre a son 
edifice, Rec. Dalloz 2011, p. 1325 et seq.
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o f  an um brella term  th a t gives a nam e to  the  rights, w hich have been confer­
red on the  citizens o f  the  M em ber States anyway.23
This argum ent is no t convincing.24 It is correct th a t the  possession o f  a na­
tional citizenship is a prerequisite for the  acquisition o f  U nion  citizenship. 
However, the  logical conclusion th a t the  acquisition o f  the  citizenship lim its 
the  poten tia l o f  U nion  citizenship, needs fu rther justification. The w ording 
o f  the  Treaty is no t a valid argum ent. A ccording to  Article 20 T F E U  U n ­
ion citizenship shall be additional to  and  no t replace national citizenship. 
This form ulation  suggests th a t E uropean citizenship is has an au tonom ous 
character. This is even truer, since earlier w ordings o f  the  contract held  tha t 
citizenship o f  the  U nion  was only com plem enting  national citizenship.25 The 
U nion  citizenship appears as an au tonom ous concept, if  approached form  
the  historical perspective. It stands for a political p rogram m e o f a Europe 
o f  the  citizens targeted as early as in the  60s. The program m e d id  no t only 
include the  extension o f  the  right o f  residence, bu t also the  social equalisation 
o f  E U  citizens and  nationals as well as the  guarantee o f  political rights.26 It is 
hard  to  im agine tha t this p rogram m e was officially realised in 1992  w ith  the 
inclusion o f citizenship in the texts o f  the  treaty and  th a t it was only about 
giving a nam e to  the  different elem ents scattered in the different parts o f  the 
treaty. In contrast, Article 25  T F E U  links the  reporting  on the  im plem enta­
tio n  o f  rules connected to  U nion  citizenship to  the  fu rther developm ent o f 
the  U nion. The M aastricht Treaty was certainly no t the  final step w ith in  the 
program  o f  the „Europe o f  citizens“; it rather m arked a beginning o f  its new  
phase. W h a t Europe o f  citizens m eans, has to  be defined continuously. In any
23 See the similar position of S. Haack, Staatsangehörigkeit — Unionsbürgerschaft — Völkerre­
chtssubjektivität, [in:] J. Isensee, P. Kirchhof, Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, Band X: Deutschland in der Staatengemeinschaft, 3. Aufl., Heidelberg 2012, No. 
28—29, see also K. Hailbronner, D. Thym, op. cit., p. 2011.
24 Against it also D. Kochenov, op. cit., p. 106 („ius tractum nature does not mean ius tractum 
essence“).
25 To what extent this change in the wording plays a crucial role is controversial. As here Nette­
sheim, Der „Kernbereich“ der Unionsbürgerschaft — vom Schutz der Mobilität zur Gewährleistung 
eines Lebensumfelds, Juristenzeitung (JZ) 2011, p. 1036 f.; sceptical S. Haack, op. cit., No. 24.
26 See also older literature: H. Bülck, Der Europabürger, [in:] Staatsrecht — Europarecht — Völker­
recht. Festschrift fü r  Hans-Jürgen Schlochauer zu 75. Geburtstag am 28. März 1981, ed. I. von 
Münch, Berlin—New York 1981, p. 809-810; S. Magiera, Die Europäische Gemeinschaft au f 
dem Wege zu einem Europa der Bürger, “Die öffentliche Verwaltung” (DÖV) 1987, p. 222. The 
nationals of the Member States should therefore be seen not only as an „economic function 
carrier“, but as persons with all the rights and obligations making up a democratic society 
which the Member States are based upon (S. Magiera, op. cit., p. 231); see now also M. Nette­
sheim, op. cit., p. 1032.
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case, the  E uropean citizenship is an innovation , w hich I in tended  as a boost 
to  the  developm ent o f  the  European U n io n .27
From  the  perspective o f  com parative law, it can also no t be confirm ed 
th a t the m ere coexistence o f  tw o citizenships -  the  one o f  the  M em ber State 
and  the  un ion  citizenship -  precludes th a t the  latter constitutes a separate 
„substance o f  the  rights”. Thus, A rt. 37 o f  the  Swiss Federal C o nstitu tion  
defines a Swiss citizen as som eone, w ho has the  right o f  citizenship o f  a Swiss 
com m une and  a Swiss canton. Also, the citizenship o f  the N o rth  G erm an 
C onfederation  was conferred to  a person via his or her affiliation to  a M em ­
ber State o f  the  C onfederation . A nd  since bo th  Switzerland and  the N o rth  
G erm an C onfederation28 were, respectively still are, sovereign subjects o f  in ­
ternational law, it cannot be said th a t their citizenships cannot constitu te 
a substance o f  the  rights.
This argum ent is, however, also the  m ain difficulty arising ou t o f  the  new  
case law o f  the  ECJ: The European U nion  is no t sovereign.29 The sovereignty 
still rem ains w ith  the M em ber States. The E C J does no t have the  pow er to 
confer the  a ttribu te  o f  statehood upon  the  EU . I f  the  E C J deviates rights 
from  the  citizenship o f a non-sovereign entity, does it then  act u ltra  vires?
This can be explained if  one conceptually  separates the citizenship from  
the  nationality. Such a separation is no t only possible in legal theory30, it is 
also practice in  several states. In British law31, for example, nationality  m eans 
an a ttribu tion  o f  a person to  a state w ith in  the  m eaning o f  the  public in terna­
tional law. In contrast, British law  knows five categories o f  persons to  w hich 
different citizenship rights are granted.32 C itizenship is thus seen as a label 
for a particular set o f  rights to  w hich the  possession o f  the nationality  serves
27 It was recognized early, that the introduction of EU citizenship substantially changes regarding 
the legal status of the Union. See S. Hobe, Die Unionsbürgerschaft nach dem Vertrag von Maas­
tricht. A u f  dem Weg zu  einem europäischen Bundesstaat?, “Der Staat” 1993, p. 264.
28 See M. Kotulla, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte. Vom Alten Reich bis Weimar (1495 bis 1934), 
Berlin-Heidelberg 2008, p. 1932.
29 However, it should be noted that the concept of sovereignty as an explanatory model of the 
relationship between the Union and the Member States has been controversially discussed 
already for some period of time. See J. Kokott, Die Staatsrechtslehre und die Veränderung ihres 
Gegenstandes: Konsequenzen von Europäisierung und Internationalisierung, “Veröffentlichungen 
der Vereinigung Deutscher Staatsrechtslehrer” (VVDStL) Vol. 63 (2003), p. 7 et seq. and the 
following discussion, p. 71 et seq.
30 In detail Chr. Schönberger, Unionsbürger. Europas föderales Bürgerrecht in vergleichender Sicht, 
Tübingen 2005, p. 22 et seq.; G.-R. de Groot, Nationality Law, [in:] Elgar Encyclopedia o f 
Comparative Law, ed. J.M. Smits, Cheltenham-Northampton p. 477; A. Mohay, D. Muhvic, 
op. cit., p. 157.
31 G.-R. de Groot, op. cit., p. 477.
32 See British Nationality Act von 1981, Part I, British Citizenship, available under www.legisla- 
tion.gov.uk.
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as condition . However, the  citizenship represents an au tonom ous concept, 
w hich needs to  be d istinguished from  the nationality  and  the  question o f 
sovereignty. H ence, the  U nion  citizenship o f  itself has the  capacity to  confer 
rights. In contrast to  the  British categorisation o f  civil rights, U n ion  citi­
zenship can be acquired on the basis o f  different nationalities, whereas the 
British nationality  constitutes several citizenships.
The lived U nion  law emerges in a dialogue betw een the  M em ber States 
and  the ECJ. The form er agree on abstract and  general in ternational treaty 
provisions. The C o u rt’s task is to  solve practical legal issues, w hich are sub­
m itted  to  it. In  doing  so, it fills the  provisions agreed upon  by the states w ith  
tangible content. B oth the  free m ovem ent o f  the citizens o f  the  U nion  and 
the  U nion  citizenship itself found  their legal basis in the  M aastricht Treaty. 
By Article 8a o f  the  E C  Treaty, every citizen o f  the U nion  has been granted 
the  right to  m ove freely w ith in  the territo ry  o f  the  M em ber States and  reside 
therein. Five years later, in the case M artinez Sala, the ECJ filled the  w ording 
o f  tha t provision w ith  life and  found  th a t the  free m ovem ent o f  E U  citizens 
exists solely by v irtue o f  E U  citizenship;33 the em ergence o f  the  right to  free­
dom  o f  m ovem ent does therefore no t depend  on the econom ic activity o f  the 
U nion  citizen.34
W hile  in  the  case o f  M artinez Sala, it was the  in ten tion  o f  the  C o u rt to 
em phasize the  new  w ording o f  the  E C  Treaty or to  affirm it by ju d g m en t,35 
it now  seems to  be a m atter o f  rein terpreting  the  citizenship o f  the  U nion  in 
the  light o f  the  new  legal nature o f  the  E uropean U nion. The characteristics 
o f  the  E U ’s changing legal character are to  be found  in Article 2 and  A rticle 6 
T F E U . The E uropean U nion  is based on a set o f  values, in w hich the  rule o f  
law and  the  pro tection  o f  h u m an  rights are m entioned . Also, the  legal posi­
tio n  o f  the  individual is substantially strengthened, w hich becom es m anifest 
in the  em bedm ent o f  the C harter o f  Fundam ental R ights in the Treaty.
The presence o f  a cross-border elem ent is at no p o in t explicitly m en tioned  
in the E U  prim ary  law as a cond ition  for the  applicability o f  U nion  law.36
33 Case C-85/96 Martinez Sala [1998], No. 61-63.
34 Since civil rights have no absolute character and can be subject to limitations (see the wording 
of Art. 21 Abs. 1 TFEU, also P. Kubicki, Die subjektivrechtliche Komponente der Unionsbürg­
erschaft, Zeitschrift Europarecht (EuR) 2006, p. 496; S. Haack, op. cit., No. 31, it is not im­
possible to differentiate in the area of residence law taking into account the economic activity 
of the Union citizen and his property. Such differentiations are also prescribed in secondary 
legislation, see Art. 7 of the Free Movement Directive (Directive 2004/38/EC of 29 April 
2004, ABl. EU 2004 L 158/77). See also P.M. Huber, Unionsbürgerschaft, EuR 2013, p. 648; 
also A. Mohay, D. Muhvic, op. cit., p. 167-168 and p. 170.
35 See also D. Kochenov, R. Plender, op. cit., p. 373 et seq.
36 Emphatically D. Kochenov, R. Plender, op. cit., p. 377.
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It is an elem ent o f  the  case law o f  the  EC J, w hich was elaborated in order 
to  pay due regard to  the  character o f  the E U  as a un ion  o f  states aim ing at 
com pletion  o f  in ternal m arket and  p rom otion  o f  in ternational cooperation. 
I f  its legal character o f  the  E U  changes, it is no t surprising th a t the  condition  
o f  application o f  U nion  law — the  existence o f  a cross-border elem ent — is also 
p u t to  the  test. A nd  since the E U  by the Lisbon Reform  Treaty has been clear­
ly converted tow ards a polity, it is difficult to  justify the  need for a cross-bor­
der elem ent if  the  core set o f  citizenship rights is affected.
The new  approach in  the  case o f  R u iz  Z a m b r a n o  is to  be understood  p re­
cisely in this sense. However, and  at this p o in t the  critique o f  the  judgm ent is 
entirely justified37 — the  EC J has no t adequately explained its new  approach.
O utlook
W ith  a view to fu rther developm ent, the question arises w hether the  citi­
zenship inevitably leads to  the em ergence o f  a new  European sovereign pe­
ople, and  a new  E uropean state. D o  the  decisions on the  U nion  citizenship 
provoke a „bursting o f  a dam ” or do they — as it is seen by som e voices in 
the  literature — constitu te  an unstoppable legal developm ent, or even a revo­
lu tio n 38, w hich is incom patib le w ith  our legal system? Since the  question o f 
citizenship can be separated from  the  issue o f  sovereignty — as seen above — 
the  discussions about the  case R u iz  Z a m b r a n o  should  no t be dram atised and 
should  no t be regarded th rough  the prism  o f  federalism, as som e voices do .39 
It is tru e  th a t there are som e examples in history, in w hich the  establishm ent 
o f  a supranational indigenats has led to  statehood. H ere, the  N o rth  G erm an 
C onfederation  is an exam ple.40 O n  the o ther hand , there is the  example o f 
the  Socialist Federal R epublic o f  Yugoslavia, in w hich the  coexistence o f  two 
citizenships — tha t o f  the  Republics and  th a t o f  the  Federation41 — ultim ately 
led to  the  dem ise o f  the  latter. A  historical determ inism  cannot be seen.
37 See K. Hailbronner, D. Thym, op. cit., p. 2013.
38 See S. Haack, op. cit., No. 36.
39 See K. Hailbronner, D. Thym, op. cit., p. 2011; S. Haack, op. cit., No. 23, No. 36, but also 
D. Kochenov, op. cit., No. 4, p. 98.
40 Hereto in detail S. Hobe, op. cit., p. 252 ff.
41 See the Nationality Act of Yugoslavia from 1976, Sluzbeni list SFJR 58/1976. The dual cit­
izenship was considered in the Yugoslav constitutional law doctrine as an expression of the 
federal state principle, see S. Popovic, Upravno pravo, 10th edition, Belgrade 1980, p. 325. 
Under international law, relevant was only the citizenship of the Federation. The loss and the 
acquisition of the citizenship were regulated by a federal law. The citizenship laws of the mem­
ber states (the so-called Socialist Republics) referred in this regard to federal legislation, see 
S. D. Jovanovic, Drzavljanstvo Socialisticke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije, Belgrade 1977, 
p. 32—33.
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Also, a revolution in the  field o f  fundam ental right p ro tection  is no t to  be 
expected. The assum ption th a t the  ECJ will extend the no tio n  „the substance 
o f  the  rights o f  a U nion  citizen” to  a general clause is too  far-fetched. Revolu­
tionary  developm ents are no t to  be feared, as the  personal scope o f  m ost fun ­
dam ental rights does no t depend  on the  possession o f  a certain nationality. 
The core o f  the  rights w ould  be o f  im portance especially in the range o f  those 
fundam ental rights, w hich institu te  influence o f  the  individual on the  exer­
cise o f  official authority .42 M any o f them  have been codified in the  European 
C harter o f  Fundam ental R ights under the  T itle  V  („civil righ ts“).
Just as little it is to  be feared th a t Article 51 o f  the C harter o f  Fundam ental 
Rights will be underm ined . U nder this provision, the  C harter is applicable 
„only in the  case o f  enforcem ent o f  U nion  law “. The scope o f  this phrase is 
highly controversial.43 At first glance, the  new  case law  o f the  ECJ on the 
„substance o f  the  rights o f  a U nion  citizen“ is an antithesis to  the  cited regu­
lation: whereas on the  one hand , Article 51 o f  the  C harter presupposes the 
applicability o f  U nion  law  or even its enforcem ent, on the  o ther hand , the 
interference in the core o f  the  rights o f  a citizen o f  the  U nion  is conceived as 
a trigger o f  the applicability o f  U nion  law.
It has to  be adm itted  th a t the  com plex, m ulti-level system o f  protection 
o f  fundam ental rights w ith in  the  E U  could  be fu rther com plicated. H ow e­
ver, conflicting in terpretations can be avoided entirely. It m ust first be borne 
in m in d  tha t A rticle 51 applies only to  m atters governed by the C harter o f 
Fundam ental R ights.44 Parallel to  the  C harter, the  unw ritten  fundam ental 
rights developed as general principles o f  U nion  law  by the  EC J continue to 
exist. This parallelism  is explicitly stated  in prim ary  E uropean law, in  Art. 6 
para. 3 T E U .
The ruling in R u iz  Z a m b r a n o  could  be conceived as a starting  p o in t for yet 
another, th ird  level o f  fundam ental rights protection . It w ould  include those 
fundam ental rights, w hich constitu te  the  core o f  the  rights o f  a E U  citizen. 
As com pared to  the  C harter and  to  the  general principles, this th ird  level w o­
42 On this issue from the perspective of German constitutional law see P.M. Huber, Unionsbürg­
erschaft, EuR 2013, p. 650 ff.
43 See J. Meyer, S. Magiera, Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union, Baden-Baden 2011, 
Art. 51, No. 30-30a. For recent case law see Case C-617/10 Akerberg Fransson [2013] and the 
critique of the German constitutional Court and academics in Germany see D. Thym, Die 
Reichweite der EU-Grundrechte-Charta — Z u  viel Grundrechtsschutz?, NVwZ 2013, p. 889 et 
seq.
44 This question is controversial, see W. Weiß, Grundrechtsschutz durch den EuGH: Tendenzen seit 
Lissabon, Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (EuZW) 2013, p. 288. A different inter­
pretation would not be compatible with the wording of Art. 51 of the Charta („The provisions 
of this Charter are addressed to ...“).
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u ld  be, o f  course, depicted by a w ide personal scope o f  the  rights conferred: 
only the  status o f  a citizen o f  the  U nion  w ould  activate the pro tection  under 
U nion  law. But even in this respect, it should  be n o ted  th a t the  th ird -co u n ­
try  nationals w ould  enjoy at best only derivative protection. M oreover, the 
level o f  m aterial p ro tection  gran ted  on the  basis o f  the R u iz  Z a m b r a n o  ruling 
could  no t be com pared to  the  level o f  p ro tection  gran ted  by the  C h arta  and 
the  general principles. Even the  choice o f  words -  „the substance o f  the  ri­
gh ts“ -  illustrates this. C urrently, only the  right no t to  be com pelled to  leave 
the  territo ry  o f  the U nion , has been accepted as belonging to  this substance. 
It is unlikely tha t the  C o u rt will display particular am bitions to  extend the 
area o f  the „substance o f  rights”. The ECJ as „m otor o f  in teg ra tion“ should  
no t w ork  as am bitiously in the  area o f  citizenship as it does in o ther fields o f 
law.45 In this regard, the  trad itional m arket- or m obility- orien ted  approach is 
m ore efficient th an  the  new  one based on citizenship. The right o f  residence 
o f  a spouse o f  a U nion  citizen w ho has exercised the  freedom  o f  m ovem ent 
-  just to  look at the  cases o f  C arpenter and  M etock46-  has a broader scope 
th an  the  right o f  residence based on a U nion  citizenship o f  a person w ho 
stays in  his hom e country, as it can be seen in the  case o f  M cC arthy, w hich 
is the citizenship approach judgem ent.47 So far, the  EC J shows th a t different 
national regulations can be to lerated  m ore easily in respect o f  „the substance 
o f  the  righ ts“ th an  in  the presence o f  the  cross-border elem ent. In fact, the 
function ing  o f  the U nion  as a legal com m unity  does in  the  case o f  a purely 
national issue no t depend  to  the same extent on the  un iform ity  o f  the  appli­
cation and the in terp re ta tion  o f  U nion  law as it does in the case o f  the use o f 
freedom  o f  m ovem ent. Therefore an im portan t argum ent48 for the  dynam ic 
developm ent o f  U nion  law by ECJ does no t apply.
The right o f  residence o f  family m em bers o f  a U nion  citizen is also consi­
dered a classic exam ple o f  the  so-called „reverse d iscrim ination“, w hich exists 
w hen citizens o f  o ther E U  M em ber States are better o ffcom pared  to  residents 
for reasons o f  U nion  law. Therefore, the  question arises w hether the  concept 
o f  „the substance o f  the  rights o f  a U nion  citizen“ defused the  problem  o f 
reverse d iscrim ination. A t first glance, the poten tia l o f  the  new  approach can­
no t be neglected.49 Since a possible violation o f  „the substance o f  the  righ ts“
45 For a different opinion see S. Haack, op. cit., No. 23, 34.
46 Case C-60/00 Carpenter [2001]; Case C-127/08 Metock [2008].
47 Case C-434/09 McCarthy [2009].
48 Regarding the reasons for the dynamic interpretation see R. Bieber, A. Epiney, M. Haag, Die 
Europäische Union, 10. Aufl., Baden-Baden 2013, § 9, No. 5.
49 The ruling of Ruiz Zambrano is interpreted as a prohibition of the discrimination of own
nationals by J. Bergmann, op. cit., p. 318. See also A. Mohay, D. Muhvic, op. cit., p. 171 f.
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is no t lim ited  to  the  crossing o f  a frontier, the  substance o f  the rights can be 
affected by purely in ternal situations w ith in  one M em ber State. H ence the 
status o f  a national can be affected w ithou t h im  leaving his hom e country  
if  he considers h im self disadvantaged com pared to  a E U  im m igran t.50 This 
situation  is o f  concern w ith  regard to  the  equal trea tm en t com m andm ents 
con tained  in the  constitu tions o f  the  M em ber States.
The constitutional problem  im posed by European U nion  law discrim ina­
tion  is no t solved by the new  judgm ent, bu t at best relocated. Even if  one were 
to  assume tha t European citizenship dem ands equal treatm ent o f  all E U  citi­
zens and  thus also prohibits reverse discrim ination, this does no t apply to  all 
residents, bu t only for those w ho possess the  citizenship o f  the  U nion. Thus, 
another constitutional problem  w ould  open up: the problem  o f  disadvantage 
o f  residents w ithou t citizenship o f  the  U nion  in relation to  E U  citizens. For 
example, according to  the  G erm an constitu tion , the possession o f  a certain 
nationality  alone does no t justify a different treatm ent o f  foreigners — except 
from  a few exceptions provided by the  constitu tion  itself. D ifferentiations 
need to  be m easured according to  the general principle o f  equality, w hich is 
codified in Art. 3 para. 1 o f  the G erm an Basic Law.51 Furtherm ore, no t all dif­
ferentiations between citizens o f  the  U nion w ould  be covered, bu t only those 
falling under the area o f  “substance the  rights”. The concept o f  “the  substance 
o f  rights” w ould be than  o f  no use for G erm an breweries tha t do no t w ant to  
brew  according to  the G erm an purity  law52 — another classic example o f  natio ­
nal discrim ination — even if  the brewer is a citizen o f the U nion. W hether the 
R u iz  Z a m b ra n o  ru ling  applies to  the  case o f  dom estic legal persons suffering 
from  a less favourable treatm en t in relation to  legal persons from  other EU  
countries is doubtful, given tha t the  w ording o f the  provisions on citizenship 
relate to  natural persons only; the extent to  w hich a corresponding application 
o f  the Z a m b ra n o  approach is possible, rem ains unclear.53
50 A.G. Sharpston requested a clarification by the ECJ in the case of Ruiz Zambrano, see 
A.G. Sharpston 30.09.2010, No. 143—144.
51 See T. Milej, Verfassungsmäßigkeit der Unterscheidung nach dem Merkmal der Staatsangehörig­
keit im Bereich der gewährenden Staatstätigkeit, NVwZ 2013, p. 689.
52 As a result of a free movement of goods, beer fabricated in violation of medieval German 
purity law in the EU member States other than Germany may be sold on the German market, 
whereas such beer fabricated in Germany may not.
53 There are some TFEU provisions, which confer certain rights expressis verbis to both citizens of 
the Union as well as legal persons, such as Article 228 TFEU, which codifies the right to refer 
a complaint to the European Citizens’ Rights Ombudsman. It can this be concluded that legal 
persons can enjoy certain civil rights only if this is expressly so provided in the Treaty. For an 
application of civil rights to legal persons see Ch. Callies, M. Ruffert, W. Kluth, EUV/AEUV, 
4th edition, München 2011, Art. 20, No. 10. Sceptical J. Schwarze, U. Becker, A. Hatje, 
J. Schoo, EU-Kommentar, 3th edition, Baden-Baden 2012, Art. 20 AEUV, No. 11.
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C onclusion
The fundam ental problem  o f  the  new  approach o f  the  ECJ is the vagueness 
o f  the  concept o f  the  „substance o f  the  righ ts“ o f  a U nion  citizen.54 W e leave 
the  fam iliar and  we do no t know  w here to  head for. W e w ant m ore th an  just 
a m arket citizen, bu t we do no t know  exactly w hat depicts a citizen o f  the 
U nion. W e do no t even know  in w hich area to  search for a definition o f the 
substance o f  European citizenship. The enum eration  o f  civil rights o f  the 
U nion  in A rticle 20 et seq T F E U  is open and  to  be developed. The exten­
sive catalogue o f  values and  objectives o f  in tegration, w hich can be found  
in Art. 2 and  3 T E U , does hardly give any guidance, as som e o f  the  values 
and  objectives are m utually  exclusive. The same is tru e  for the  abstract ideas 
invoked in the  literature, such as equality or freedom 55 or -  here is a quote  -  
„views about life in just (maybe even good) cond itions“.56 However, the  new  
approach o f  the  EC J does no t autom atically  lead to  a supranational state. It is 
rather a m oderate change o f  law and  a con tribu tion  o f the  C o u rt to  a closer 
U nion  o f  the  peoples o f  Europe, w hich the pream bles o f  the  founding  Tre­
aties have repeatedly since 1951 declared as the  aim  o f  E uropean integration. 
It is a small step w ith  great sym bolic power. It shows th a t the C o u rt u n d er­
stands the E uropean U nion  no t only as a m arket bu t also as a polity.
Streszczenie
Istota praw  obywatelstwa Unii w  najnowszym  orzecznictwie TSUE  
-  potencjał i ograniczenia
Orzecznictwo TSUE kontynuujące linię orzeczniczą rozpoczętą wyrokiem w sprawie 
Ruiz Zam brano stało się przyczynkiem do dyskusji o rozszerzeniu zakresu prawa poby­
tu w UE dla krewnych obywateli Unii. Orzecznictwo to nasuwa jednak także pytania 
bardziej zasadniczej natury: Do jakiego stopnia obywatel Unii jest kimś więcej, aniżeli 
tylko uczestnikiem Wspólnego Rynku? Czy sama koncepcja obywatelstwa Unii może 
stanowić źródło, z którego da się wywieść niepisane prawa? Czy koncepcja ta stanowi 
rozszerzenie zakresu ochrony praw podstawowych, czy może także sprzeczne z traktata­
mi rozszerzenie kompetencji UE? Oraz wreszcie, jakie wnioski da się na podstawie tego 
orzecznictwa wyciągnąć co do charakteru prawnego samej Unii? Niniejszy tekst stanowi 
próbę odpowiedzi na te pytania.
Słowa kluczowe: obywatelstwo Unii, prawo pobytu, element transgraniczny, podm io­
towy zakres stosowania traktatów, istota praw obywatela Unii
54 This point ofview is shared by both supporters (D. Kochenov, R. Plender, op. cit., p. 390-391; 
D. Kochenov, op. cit., p. 122) and critics (see K. Hailbronner, D. Thym, op. cit, p. 2013) of 
the new approach.
55 See D. Kochenov, op. cit., p. 132.
56 M. Nettesheim, op. cit., p. 1032.
